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1. Introduction 
 
In Bangla, the negated complement of the existential modal predicate par- (in epistemic 
and in deontic readings) shows an obligatory additive particle ‘-o’. 
 
Epistemic use of the modal: 
(1)  Ritu ækhon  baṛi-te   na-#(o)  thak-te  pare 
   Ritu now  home-loc neg-O stay-inf may.pres.3 
   ‘It is possible that Ritu is not at home now.’ [may > neg] 
   #‘It is not possible that Ritu is at home now.’ [# neg > may] 
 
(2)  Ritu ækhon  baṛi-te   na  thak-te-#(o)   pare 
   Ritu  now  home-loc neg stay-inf   may.pres.3 
   ‘It is possible that Ritu is not at home now.’ 
 
While (2) is more general, (1) is particularly used for polarity contrast. I would 
concentrate on analyzing (1) in this squib. 
 
Deontic use of the modal: 
(3)  tumi  ice-cream-ṭa   na-#(o)  khe-te  paro 
   you icre-cream-cla. neg-O eat-inf may.pres.2 
   ‘You are allowed to not eat the ice-cream.’ 
 
 The paper tries to understand this particular instance of obligatoriness of the Additive 
particle. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 Background on Negation in Bangla 
 
The position of sentential negation in Bangla usually depends on the presence or absence 
of the Tense inflection on the verb. The negation follows a verb form that is marked with 
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Tense ((4) below) while it precedes a verb form lacking Tense inflection in embedded 
clauses (see Simpson and Sourov (2014)). The protasis of conditional provides an 
exception to this distribution, as in this clause, the negation occurs before a verb form 
marked with Tense (see Ramchand (2014) for an analysis). For the purposes of this paper 
it is important to note that only the negation in pre-verbal position can host an Additive 
particle (or any emphatic clitic). Moreover, even among pre-verbal negation, the 
appearance of the Additive particle is limited to only two constructions: the cases 
illustrated in (1) through (3) and in Concessive conditionals. I refrain from discussing 
Concessive Conditionals in this paper for the sake of brevity.   
 
In examples (1) through (3), the existential modal has scope over negation. To get the 
negation over modal reading, the negation has to be placed after the modal. Example (4) 
with post-verbal negation on the matrix modal predicate pare represents the negation 
over modal reading.  
 
(4)  Ritu ækhon  baṛi-te   thak-te  pare   na 
   Ritu now  home-loc stay-inf may.pres.3 neg 
   ‘It is not possible that Ritu is at home now.’ [neg > may] 
   #It is possible that Ritu is not at home now. [# may > neg] 
   
 
2.2 Background on the Additive Particle  
 
The Additive Particle -o is one of the two ‘emphatic’ clitics in the language. Bayer and 
Lahiri (1990) (among others) discusses the distribution of the particle and gives a 
syntactic account of its scope. The particle -o triggers an Additive presupposition about 
its Associate, which is often the constituent the particle cliticizes to.1 The following 
examples illustrate the variation in meaning resulting from the different positions of –o in 
simple sentences. 
 
On Subject: 
Context: Manoj came to the party last night, and… 
 
(5)  Robi-o  eSechilo. 
   Robi-O came.3 
   ‘[Robi]F came too.’ 
 
The sentence asserts that Robi came and the –o on Robi gives rise to the presupposition 
that somebody other than Robi came.  
 The presence of –o on the subject triggers alternatives of the sentence, which are of 
the form [came(x): x ∈ De] and the particle is anaphoric to atleast one such alternative 
salient in the context.  
 
 																																																								
1 The particle can also mean ‘even’ in appropriate contexts. It is a close parallel of Hindi –bhii as discussed 
in Lahiri (1998). 
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On Object: 
Context: Robi read the magazine, and… 
 
(6)  Robi  boi-ṭa-o   por ̣ẹche 
   Robi book-cla-O read.3 
   ‘Robi read [the book]F as well.’ 
 
The sentence asserts that Robi has read the book and the –o on book gives rise to the 
presupposition that other than the book there is something else that Robi has read.  
 With –o on the object in the given context, we are considering alternatives of the form 
[read(r, x): x ∈ De]. 
 
On Intransitive verb: 
Context: Robi has done the assignment, he went to the party, and… 
 
(7)  Robi ghumiye-o-che 
   Robi sleep.pfv-O-asp.pres.3 
   ‘Robi has [slept]F as well.’ 
 
The sentence asserts that Robi has slept and the –o on slept gives rise to the 
presupposition that other than sleeping, Robi has done something else (i.e., some other 
predicate is true of Robi).  
 The additive particle marks alternatives of the form [R(r): R∈ D<et>] 
 
On a Transitive verb: 
(8)  Robi  boi-ṭa   por ̣ẹ-o-che 
   Robi book-cla  read-pfv-O-pfv-pres.3 
   ‘Robi has [read]F the book as well.’ 
 
In (8), -o attaches to the verb, triggering relevant alternatives of the form [R(r, the book): 
R∈ D<e,et>] . The construction is usable in contexts where there is an antecedent that 
entails that Robi did something else with the book. For example, 
 
(9) Robi Sudhu  boi-Ta  kene-i-ni,       Robi  boi-Ta    poṛe-o-che. 
 Robi only  book-cla buy.pfv-I-neg-pfv,  Robi  book-cla   read.pfv-O-asp.pres.3 
 ‘Robi not only [bought] the book, he [read]F it as well.’ 
 
In the cases above (5 to 9), –o clearly marks the constituent which has to be replaced with 
elements of the same type, to obtain the focus value of the sentence. Being an additive 
particle it presupposes that one of the (contextual) alternatives of the sentence is true.  
 
There are constructions in which the constituent that is –o marked and the constituent that 
is actually focused do not match. The clearest example at hand is a construction like (6) 
above, except used in a different context.  
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On Object: 
Context: Robi watered the plants and… 
 
(10) … o    boi-ṭa-o   poṛeche 
        pron.3  book-cla-O read.3 
  ‘…he read the book as well.’ 
 
In (10), the Additive presupposition is that Robi did something else, other than reading 
the book. Therefore, even though –o appears on the object, the entire VP is focused, as is 
fitting to the context, and consequently, the relevant alternatives of the sentence are of the 
form [R(r) : R ∈ D<et>].  
 
Considering just these cases, it seems the occurrence of –o is like an F-marker with usual 
F-projection properties.2 It can be shown that –o behaves like the additive operator as 
well (Guha 2016ms.). 
 
3. Additive particle on negation 
3.1. The meaning of the construction 
 
Assuming the Additive attribute of –o, the meaning of sentence (1) would be: 
 
(1)  Ritu ækhon  baṛi-te   na-#(o)  thak-te  pare 
   Ritu now  home-loc neg-O stay-inf may.pres.3 
   ‘It is possible that Ritu is not at home now.’ 
 
a. Assertion: It is possible that Ritu is not at home now. 
b. Presupposition: It is possible that Ritu is at home now. 
 
So in effect, uttering (1) in Bangla amounts to uttering it is also possible that Ritu is not 
at home now in English.  
 
Interestingly, the following sentence shows that this intuition is on the right track. 
Consider: 
 
(11)  Ritu ækhon  baṛi-te   na-(#o)  thak-te  pare    na3 
   Ritu now  home-loc neg-O stay-inf may.pres.3 neg 
   ‘It is not possible that Ritu is not at home now.’ 
 
Here –o cannot appear on the embedded negation, because if it did it would lead to a 
contradictory Additive presupposition as predicted by the meaning above. Let us see the 
meanings of the infelicitous version of (11), which is (12) with na-o in the embedded 
clause.  																																																								
2 –o does not appear on attributive adjectives (*[A-o NP]), or on nouns inside postpositional phrases (*[NP-
o P]), and the idea of –o being an F-marker would require further qualifications for such cases. (see Bayer 
and Lahiri (1990), for a syntactic proposal) 
3 A metalinguistic use of the matrix negation might make the construction acceptable with –o.  
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(12) #Ritu  ækhon  baṛi-te   na-o   thak-te  pare  na 
   Ritu  now  home-loc neg-O stay-inf may neg 
 
a.  Assertion: It is not possible that Ritu is not at home now. 
b.  Additive presupposition: It is not possible that Ritu is at home now. 
 
Clearly (12a) and (12b) are contradictory. Within the same domain of worlds, Ritu has to 
either be at home or not be at home. Both of these cannot be ‘not possible’ (impossible) 
as the assertion and the presupposition would yield. That is why the use of –o in this 
sentence is infelicitous. 
 
3.2. The affirmative complement of par-  
 
In contrast with the negative complement that we have discussed so far, the affirmative 
complement of the existential modal predicate par- does not appear with an obligatory 
additive particle. 
 
(13)  Ritu ækhon  baṛi-te   thak-te-(o)   pare 
   Ritu now  home-loc stay-inf-(O)  may.pres.3 
   ‘It is possible that Ritu is at home now.’ 
 
3.3. Context dependency 
 
A brief survey reveals that the obligatoriness of –o in the complement of the existential 
modal is dependent on the context. When the antecedent entails that it is possible that 
Ritu is at home now, the utterance must contain the additive particle in the negative 
complement.   
 
Scenario 1:  
 A:  Ami Ritur baṛi jacchi. O Sadharonoto ækhon baṛitei thake. 
    ‘I am going to Ritu’s place. She is usually at home now.’ 
 
 B:  Right, but 
(14)  Ritu ækhon  baṛi-te   na-#(o)  thak-te  pare 
   Ritu now  home-loc neg-O stay-inf may.pres.3 
   ‘It is also possible that Ritu is not at home now.’ 
 
In Scenario 1, A’s utterance entails the proposition it is possible that Ritu is at home now, 
which is also what B’s utterance (14) presupposes by the particle –o. 
 
On the other hand, when the antecedent entails it is possible that Ritu is not at home now, 
the utterance must contain the additive particle in the affirmative complement.  
  
Scenario 2:  
 A:  Ritu Sadharonoto ækhon baṛi-te thakena. 
    ‘Ritu is usually not at home at this hour.’ 
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 B:  Right, but, 
(15)  Ritu ækhon  baṛi-te   thak-te-#(o)  pare 
   Ritu now  home-loc stay-inf-O  may.pres.3 
   ‘It is also possible that Ritu is at home now.’ 
 
In Scenario 2, A’s utterance entails the proposition it is possible that Ritu is not at home 
now, which is also what B’s utterance (15) presupposes by the particle –o. 
 
To summarize, when the context takes it for granted that [ ◊ p ], and the speaker wants to 
assert that [◊ (¬ p)], the additive particle has to be used to refer to the presupposed 
possibility. Similarly, in a context that takes [◊ (¬ p)] for granted, the assertion [ ◊ p ] 
must signal that the other possibility is also available.  
 Note that, p and ¬(p) are mutually exclusive and cannot hold in the same world.  
 
3.4. The meaning contribution of –o as an anaphor 
 
Kripke (1990ms./2009) argued that too is an anaphor that refers to parallel information in 
the `active' context. Heim (1992) had formally represented the proposal of Kripke by 
making too coindexed with the relevant constituent in the antecedent. For example, notice 
the indexing in the following example. 
 
(16) Pikui lives in Delhi and Anui lives in Delhi tooi. 
 
which says: Anu lives in Delhi, in addition to Piku. 
 
Heim takes the general rule for the interpretation of too to be: 
 
(17) ϕ[αF]tooi presupposes xi ≠ α ⋀ϕ(xi)=1 
 
Chemla and Schlenker (2012), analyzed tooi to be a propositional anaphor. They defined 
tooi in Rooth's Alternative semantics. An expression E has an ordinary semantic value 
⟦E⟧o and a focus semantic value ⟦E⟧f. The interpretation function is relativized to an 
assignment function g and an evaluation world w. If tooi takes a clause ϕ as its argument, 
the result will have the value in (18). (`#' means `undefined')  
(18) ⟦ϕ tooi⟧
g
o
,w
= # unless, 
a. g(i)(w)=1 
b. ⟦g(i)⟧o ∈ ⟦ϕ⟧
g
f
 
c. ⟦g(i)⟧o ≠ ⟦ϕ⟧
g
o
 
 If ⟦ϕ tooi⟧
g
o
,w
≠ #, then ⟦ϕ tooi⟧
g
o
,w
= ⟦ϕ⟧
g
o
,w
 
 
Among the definedness conditions, (18.a) says the proposition that tooi is anaphoric to is 
true; (18.b) says the ordinary semantic value of the proposition is an element of the focus 
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semantic value of the utterance ϕ; (18.c) says the ordinary semantic value of that 
proposition is different from the ordinary semantic value of ϕ. The last line says that tooi 
does not have any contribution in the asserted content of ϕ. 
 
For the additive particle –o, I adopt Heim’s analysis in Chemla and Schlenker’s 
formulation. That is, I take -o to be anaphoric to a constituent that is an alternative of the 
focused constituent in the utterance. In (14) above, the focused constituent is NOT.  
 
In Bangla, when two embedded Intransitive-vPs are contrasted -o can appear only on the 
verb and not on the negation in the negated vP. 
 
(19)  Robi aste-o   pare, na   jete-o  pare 
   Robi come.inf-O  may, not  go.inf-O may 
   `Robi may come and not go as well.' 
 
(20)  *Robi  aste-o   pare, na-o  jete   pare 
   Robi   come.inf-O may, not-O go.inf  may 
   `Robi may come and not go as well.' 
 
However in Polarity contrast, the best option is to have -o on negation. 
 
(21)  Robi aste-o   pare,  na-o   aste    pare 
   Robi come.inf-O may,  not-O  come.inf  may 
   `Robi may come and he may not come as well.' 
 
The example (21) is like example (14) in Scenario 1, which motivates the conclusion that 
NOT is focused in (14). 
 
Going back to the meaning of (14) in Scenario 1, the antecedent entails [It is possible that 
Ritu is at home], which can be represented as [MAY [AFFi [Ritu be at home]]], where 
`AFFi’ is the affirmative operator, the relevant alternative of NOT. Considering –o as the 
anaphor, -o bears the index ‘i’.  
 
The utterance (14) in Scenario 1 can be represented as:  
 
(22) [Not-oi] λ7 [MAY [t7 [Ritu be at home]]]  
Let, ϕ be the function [λ7 [MAY [t7 [Ritu be at home]]]. 
Then,   
(23) ⟦(13)⟧
g
o
,w
= ⟦ [NOT- oi] ϕ ⟧
g
o
,w
 = # unless, 
a. ϕ (g(i))(w)=1 
b. ⟦g(i)⟧o ∈ ⟦NOT⟧
g
f
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c. ⟦g(i)⟧o ≠ ⟦NOT⟧
g
o
 
 … where g(i) = AFF 
 
These definedness conditions form the meaning contribution of –o in (14)4 :  
(24) [ϕ (AFF)(w)=1 ⋀ ⟦AFF⟧o ∈ ⟦NOT⟧
g
f
  ⋀ ⟦AFF⟧o ≠ ⟦NOT⟧
g
o
 ] 
 
3.5. Asymmetry in availability of alternatives 
 
There is an inherent asymmetry between [◊ (p)] and [◊ (¬ p)]. For [◊ (¬ p)] the additive 
particle seems obligatory, but for [◊ (p)] that is not the case, until one adds [◊ (¬ p)] in the 
context.  
 
In terms of alternatives, this asymmetry can be restated as, [◊ (¬ p)] by default has [◊ (p)] 
as a formal alternative, but not vice versa. [◊ (p)] can have [◊ (¬ p)] as an alternative only 
when it is made salient as a contextual alternative.  
 
The asymmetry in terms of alternatives can be readily captured in terms of the notion of 
(structural) Complexity as defined for the derivation of Formal alternatives in Fox and 
Katzir (2011).  
 
(25) Focus-sensitive version of Complexity from Fox and Katzir (2011): 
 
The set of formal alternatives of S, F(S) is defined as the set of all structures obtained 
from S by replacing focused constituents within S with constituents that are at most as 
complex as the original constituents.   
 
(26) Source of substitution for a given constituent X in context C: 
a. The lexicon 
b. The sub-constituents of X 
c. The set of salient constituents in C 
 
For the case under discussion, Complexity, will allow (27) to have (28) as one of its 
formal alternatives. 
(27) [It is possible that John is notF at home] 
(28) [It is possible that John is at home] 
 
To implement Fox and Katzir (2011)’s notion of Complexity in this case appropriately, I 
would have to assume ∑P (Laka 1990), so that NEG can have AFF as an alternative.  
 
(29) [It is possible that John is [ΣP [not]F at home] ]5 
(30) [It is possible that John is [ΣP [Aff] at home] ] 																																																								
4 In Guha(2016ms.) I discuss problems with this meaning (24) and suggest a modification.  
5 For Bangla, ΣP, above TP, would be the highest projection below CP. The clause that does not have ΣP 
will have TP as its highest projection.  
169
Obligatory Additive Particle on Negation 	
	
 
But, Complexity will prevent (31) from having (32) as a formal alternative, as (32) is 
structurally more complex than (31), because according to Laka’s proposal a simple 
affirmative sentence (31) does not have ∑P, but (32) does. 
 
(31) [It is possible that John is at home] 
(32) [It is possible that John is [∑P not at home]] 
 
Only when (32) is made salient in the context, (32) would be part of the set of alternatives 
of (31).  
 Note, if we assume that ∑P has a different type from TP, then a type-based theory of 
alternatives could also derive the asymmetry.  
 
There is an interesting aspect of using ∑P syntax here. Laka argues that emphatic 
affirmatives (John did come) have ∑P in their structure. So the prediction would be, 
when [◊ (p)] is an emphatic affirmative, [◊ (¬ p)] would be available as a formal 
alternative. So for affirmatives, we have two options, [◊ (p)] and [◊ (p)-o]. The latter 
could represent the emphatic affirmative, which has [◊ (¬ p)] as alternative.  For [◊ (¬ p)] 
we do not have such structural ambiguity. 
 
3.6. Implicatures 
 
For sentence (14) in Scenario 1, the utterance is : 
 
(33) φ = [◊ (¬ p)] ⋀ [◊ p] 
 
Since NOT is F-marked, the only formal alternative of φ in context C that we consider is: 
 
(34) ALT (φ,C) : [◊ p] ⋀ [◊ p] 
 
The ALT in (34) is entailed by the φ.	Therefore, it does not lead to a S.I. (Secondary 
Implicature) 
 
If we considered just the prejacent ψ (35) of the additive particle, and that the entire 
sentence is focused, so that both the modal and the negation are focused, then we derive 
mutually exclusive alternatives to ψ. 
 
(35) ψ = ◊ (¬ p) 
 
(36) ALT(φ,C) :   
a. ◊ p 
b. ⧠ (¬ p) 
c. ⧠ p 
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Assuming an opinionated speaker,  
(37) Quality Implicature(Q.I.) : BS [◊ ¬(p)]           (the speaker believes that [◊ ¬(p)]) 
 
(38) Primary Implicatures(P.I.) :   
 
a. ¬ BS [◊ p ] 
b. ¬ BS [⧠ (¬ p)] 
     
The ALTs (36.a) and (36.b) are mutually contradictory and (36.c) contradicts the Q.I. 
(and 36.b). Therefore, none of them would lead to Secondary Implicature (S.I.), and we 
would get Ignorance Inferences from (38.a) and (38.b).  
 
However, the ALT (36.a) is presupposed, so that cannot become an Ignorance Inference. 
In that case, ALT (36.b) can lead to a S.I. that is consistent with the Q.I. and we don't 
derive any Ignorance Inferences. 
 
(39) Secondary Implicature(S.I.) : BS ¬ [⧠ (¬ p)] 
As it happens, the S.I. (39) is equivalent to the presupposition [◊ p]. 
 
3.7. Deriving Obligatoriness: Maximize Presupposition! 
 
The maxim of Maximize Presupposition states, “make your contribution presuppose as 
much as possible!” (from Sauerland 2008’s interpretation of Heim 1991) The maxim 
applies at situations when we encounter a competition between a pair of contextually 
equivalent sentences S and S’, such that S has a presupposition and S’ does not. S’ can be 
used only if the speaker is certain that the presupposition is not common ground or if the 
speaker is not certain whether the presupposition is common ground.  
 
Applying the maxim to the case at hand: 
 
The context of the utterance entails: [It is possible p] 
 
Utterance: 
 
(40) It is also possible ¬ p. 
 
The prejacent of the Additive particle is the Assertion : 
 
(41) ψ = [It is possible ¬ p]. 
  
The Presupposition is (42) which is the formal and contextual Alternative of (41): 
 
(42) π = [It is possible p]. 
 
The utterance is: 
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(43) [ψ ⋀ π] 
If the speaker did not use the Additive particle, she would in effect utter just ψ. 
 
Uttering ψ would implicate ¬ [φ ⋀ π], which in turn would implicate that the 
presupposition π is not common ground. 
 
(44) ψ ⤳ ¬ [ψ ⋀ π] = ¬ ψ ⋁ ¬ π 
 
(¬ ψ) is ruled out by the utterance ψ. Therefore, ψ implicates (¬ π). 
 
(45) [ π ] =  [It is possible p] 
 
[¬  π ] here indicates that the speaker knows that π is not satisfied or more crucially, that 
the speaker does not know whether π is satisfied.  
 
However, [It is possible p] is already part of the common ground. Hence, the Implicated 
Presupposition [Certain ¬ (It is possible p)] or [¬ Certain (It is possible p)] is 
incompatible with this discourse. Therefore, to avoid the Implicated Presupposition, the 
speaker has to Maximize Presupposition! 
  
4. Extending the analysis  
4.1.1. Discussion of other Mutually Exclusive cases 
 
We have discussed the case of p  and ¬(p) under an existential modal predicate. Since, p  
and ¬(p) cannot hold in the same world, in a context that takes p for granted one cannot 
felicitously assert [◊ (¬ p)]. In other words, the narrow scope of the Additive particle is 
contradictory in the case under discussion, because that would make the assertion and the 
presupposition contradictory.  
 
Let us now look at cases involving mutually exclusive alternatives under the possibility 
modal, which are equally ‘complex’.  
 
Scenario 4: 
 
 News on TV: 
 ‘The World Chess Championship is being played between Anand and Carlsen. 
Carlsen has already won two games.’ 
 
 A:  ækhono pa᷈c-Ta game baki ache. 
    ‘There are still five games to go.’ 
 
(46)  Anand-#(o)  Championship-Ta  jit-te   pare 
   Anand-O  championship-cla  win-inf may.pres.3 
   ‘Anand may win the Championship too.’ 
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The context makes the possibility of Carlsen winning the Championship salient, since he 
is already two games up. But A thinks that Anand’s chance of winning is still open. A 
takes the context to entail [◊ win (carlsen)] and utters: [◊ win (anand)]-also. 
 
Since, the antecedent is [◊ win (carlsen)], also in the utterance (42) is anaphoric to it, and 
not just to the complement clause [win (carlsen)] at the exclusion of the modal. In other 
words, also has wide scope in this context.  
  
(47) Wide scope: 
a. Assertion: It is possible that Anand will win. 
b. Additive presupposition: It is possible that Carlsen will win.  
 
Given [win (anand)] and [win (carlsen)] are mutually exclusive alternatives, the narrow 
scope of also is ruled out.  
 
(48) Narrow scope: 
a. Assertion: It is possible that Anand will win. 
b. (#) Additive presupposition: that Carlsen will win. 
 
Thus effectively we will get the inference (due to ‘local effect’) it is possible that Anand 
and Carlsen will win, which is not permissible in the given scenario. 
 
4.1.2. Regular mutually compatible cases 
 
As is evident from the discussion above, if we do not set up mutually incompatible 
opposition then the so called narrow scope reading would become possible.  
 
Scenario 5: 
 Ritu wants to visit Robi and Shomir now. 
 
 A: Robi is at home now. 
 
 B: 
(48)  Somir-#(o)  ækhon  baṛi-te   thak-te  pare 
   Shomir-O   now  home-loc stay-inf may.pres.3 
   ‘It is possible that Shomir is also at home now.’ 
 
(49) Narrow scope:  
 a.  Assertion: It is possible that Shomir is at home. 
 b. Additive presupposition: Robi is at home. 
 
In the context of what A says in the conversation above, (49.b) is the salient additive 
presupposition. This presupposition is obtained by the narrow scope of the Additive 
particle.  
 If the scenario was set appropriately, in this case the wide scope could be infelicitous. 
It is easy to see that with the deontic modal par- `may’.  
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Scenario 6: 
 A:  Robi had the ice cream, though he was not allowed to have it. 
 
(50) #Somir-o   icecreamTa khe-te  pare 
   Shomir-O  icecream eat-inf may.pres.3 
 a. ‘It is allowed that Shomir also eats the icecream.'  
 b. #  ‘It is also allowed that Shomir eats the icecream.' 
 
The reading in (50.b) in Scenario 6, looks like the wide scope reading with the inference 
it is allowed that Shomir and Robi eats the icecream. However, this inference is slightly 
diffent from the wide scope reading and is due to what has been called the `obligatory 
local effect’ (Tonhauser et al. 2013).  The narrow scope of the additive along with the 
projection processes gives rise to such a meaning in this case.  
 
4.2. Obligatoriness of additive particle in mutually exclusive scenarios 
 
In Scenario 4, it is part of the common ground that [◊ win (anand)]. 
 
(51) Utterance: ϕ = ◊ win (carlsen) ⋀ ◊ win (anand) 
 
Since, [◊ win (anand)] is already part of the common ground, the additive particle has to 
be used in B’s utterance to avoid the implicated presupposition [Certain ¬[◊ win 
(anand)]] or [¬Certain [◊ win (anand)]], which are incompatible with the discourse.  
 
The discussion in section (4) shows that when the complement clause of the existential 
modal holds an Additive Particle, the shape of the presupposition triggered is dependent 
on whether we are considering mutually exclusive alternatives or mutually compatible 
ones.  
 
Summary 
 
In this squib I have discussed cases of mutually exclusive pairs of alternatives placed 
under the possibility modal. In Bangla (and in other South Asian languages), we see an 
obligatory additive particle showing up in such cases. Based on the literature on 
obligatory presuppositions, I have tried to reason that not using the additive particle with 
one possibility excludes the possibility of the other. So in scenarios, when all the 
possibilities are open, the speaker is obligated to use the additive particle to signal this 
openness. The paper also shows that in such constructions we always get a wide scope of 
the additive. 
 
The squib gives rise to important questions that must be addressed in future work. One 
needs to understand the predicate par- as opposed to other predicates expressing 
existential modality. It is important to include the concessive conditionals in the 
discussion for a fuller analysis of the phenomenon. 
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